Hamid Alkifaey

Middle East Monitor    22/11/2025

Iraq held its parliamentary elections on 11th November, the seventh since the US overthrow of the Saddam Hussein dictatorship in 2003. It’s a memorable date no doubt, and the results are also memorable for being questionable, since Iranian-backed militias and allies have secured over a hundred seats in the new parliament. The results are surprising as much as they are worrying for many Iraqis and observers.

Neither the Iraqi people, nor informed observers are convinced that the results really reflect the opinions of the majority of the Iraqi public, who have, in no uncertain terms, manifested their anger and disdain for the pro-Iran political clique that has ruled the country for the last two decades. 

It is very difficult to comprehend that Iraqis voted, in their millions, to sustain a corrupt and oppressive clique, especially those who were the perpetrators of the Heist of the Century, where, according to former finance minister, Ali Allawi, that no less than $12.5 billion was syphoned out of the Iraqi Tax Authority account; $2.5 billion of it was taken in cash from the state-owned Rafidain Bank in 2022, in broad day light. It was taken in trucks, with approvals from senior officials during the term of the weak and militia-infiltrated Kadhimi government. 

The Election Commission announced that the turnout was 56 per cent, even though the number of those who voted were only 12 million, out of almost 30 million Iraqis eligible to vote. It seems the Commission had calculated the number of actual voters, against those who had registered to vote, not against those were eligible to vote. Cynics say the elections were rigged electronically and the official turnout of 56 per cent might well refer to ‘Law 56’, which deals with fraudsters and crooks. 

A screenshot  of an internal monitor of the Iraqi Election Commission computer (pictured above), is circulating in the social media, believed to be released by one employee of the Commission. It shows clearly that the number of actual voters at the closing of polls was 8,119,143. This means that at least two million votes were added electronically to the actual number of voters in order to boost the chances of the pro-Iran candidates. Many observers and interlocutors attribute this win of the militias’ candidates to this ‘zombie’ intervention.   

There were illustrious names among the losers, two of whom were popular members of the outgoing parliament. One is the MP for Kut, Sajjad Salim, the leader of the National Independence Party. The other is the MP for Najaf, Adnan Az-Zurfi, who leads the Loyalty Party. Both MPs were pro-Western, liberal and secular. They were steadfast in their opposition to Iranian influence in Iraq and in favour of close relations with the West in general and the USA in particular. Pro-Iranian activists had tried twice to bar Salim from standing in the election, through launching legal suits, but their attempts collapsed in court. 

Az-Zurfi, a seasoned politician, who was the governor of the holy city of Najaf for many years, was a prime minister designate back in 2020, after the forced resignation of the then prime minister, Adel Abdul Mehdi, due to his government’s role in the violent crackdown of the Tishreen Intifada, where almost 800 young activists were assassinated. However, Az-Zurfi was unable to form a government due to threats from the militias, who branded him as an American lackey. Unlike Iran, the US doesn’t support those who call for closer relations with it.

In sum, the 11 November elections produced a divided parliament that is unlikely to reach an agreement soon about government formation, especially if the pro-Iran factions remain steadfast in their refusal to back a government led by the current prime minister, Muhammed Shia As-Sudani, who emerged as the leader of the biggest bloc in the new parliament with around 50 seats.  

His nemesis, former prime minister, Nuri Almaliki, whose ‘State of Law’ bloc won 30 seats, would certainly form an alliance with the leader of the Badr militia, Hadi Al-AMiri, with 19 seats, and the leader of the Asa’ib Ahlul-Haq militia, Qais Al-Khaz’ali, with 26 seats. Between them, they will have around 75 seats, which outnumbers Mr Sudani’s 50 seats.

There are, however,  a number of obstacles ahead that must be overcome for the political process to progress. One is the 2010 ruling of the Federal Court, which permitted the formation of alliances after the election, a very controversial and disruptive ruling, but was literally followed ever since. Unless this ruling is overturned by the Federal Court, Mr Sudani is likely to be outmanoeuvred by the pro-Iranian alliance. 

Mr Sudani could, nevertheless, form a cross-sectarian bloc, with Sunni and Kurdish parties, which could garner around 180 seats, enough to form a government, since this requires the backing of 165 deputies as a minimum. But such an alliance will encounter another problem; that is the two-third quorum required for the election of both the speaker and the president. 

Accordingly, there must be 220 deputies in attendance at the first session to elect the speaker. Although the president could also be elected at the first session, if not, a second session is needed with a quorum of 220 deputies to elect the president. This will be another hurdle that must be overcome for the process to move to the next stage. Then, the new president will ask the leader of the largest bloc to form a government. The largest bloc must declare itself, unopposed, in the first parliamentary session.

 In the past, blocs reached agreements on who will be the speaker, the president and the prime minister, and what is the share of each bloc in the prospective government, before they agree to attend these initial sessions. Guarantees are needed to assure blocs that their prior agreements are honoured. Only foreign powers such as the US and Iran, or both, could provide such guarantees. Blocs do not trust each other on these matters as there were past instances where agreements were reneged on by one party or the other.  

The Iranians will do their utmost to install a prime minister loyal to them, but they may settle, under US pressure, for someone who is not hostile to their continued lucrative influence in Iraq. But if the US administration enters the fray, and backs a pro-US candidate, or an independent one, it will certainly alter the balance of power in Iraq and the region. This will force the Iranians to think twice before following their customary brinkmanship-driven policies. 

After its recent losses in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, Iran is much weaker than ever; its priority is to preserve the regime and prevent its fall. It will do whatever it takes to avoid another debacle with Americans and Israelis. This may require it to back down on Iraq, especially when faced with a clear American determination to back an independent, Iran-free Iraq. For this to happen, the US needs to show a strong and unwavering stance in favour of an independent strong Iraqi government, bound by international law, and answerable only to the Iraqi people. 

President Trump’s appointed envoy to Iraq, Mr Mark Savaya, who is originally from Iraq, has his work cut out for him. He needs to be firm and steadfast. This requires the US to throw its full weight behind a candidate who is able to form a coalition that is free from Iranian influence. This may sound difficult to some, but it’s certainly achievable and has the support of Iraqis and regional US allies. 

Mr Sudani stands a good chance to be that independent candidate, given his friendly relation with Mr Savaya, his energy and pragmatic modus operandi, and his record of hard work over the last three years to stabilise Iraq. His independent tendencies have been clear. They will even be clearer if he gets more US support. 

But Sudani is by no means indispensable. A new independent candidate, who enjoys Iraqi and US support, can be found to form the next government. Iraqi faction leaders have shown pragmatism in the past, even those who are directly linked to Iran. They will jeopardise their newly-found wealth and power, if they choose to be intransigent. They will be happy to accept a candidate who enjoys US support, if they feel the US is committed to supporting him.

Failing that, Iraq will endure another four years of tumultuous unstable administration, endeavouring hard, perhaps in vain, to appease Iran and not upset the US, in addition to satisfying its numerous and incongruous components, as well as its unhappy population. It will try to spend its way out of crises and instability, but this is only possible if oil prices are high. If they fall, which looks likely in the current climate of impending world recession, Iraq will face an uncertain future.

Starmer should not shrink from telling President Trump the UK has a different Policy on Palestine since it was the British legacy that caused the problem in the first place.

Hamid Alkifaey

Judging by his last visit to the UK, in July 2018, and his second visit in June 2019, when the British public, by and large, was not so welcoming, it’s not expected that they will be very happy, this time round, to see Donald Trump in the UK again, on another unprecedented state visit, especially after his recent failures; the on-going tragedy in Gaza, which he failed to stop, the war in Ukraine, which he predicted he would stop in 24 hours if he became president, the fiasco of the tariffs, which continues to cause enormous damage to the US economy, as well as world-wide disruption, not to mention the Epstein files, which will have significant ramifications on his popularity at home.

However, it maybe, just maybe, an opportunity for the British government to improve its image among the British public, as well as worldwide, by pressing the US President to find an urgent solution to the calamity that has befallen on the Gaza civilians. Trump can easily put an end to it, if he exercises some pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu. The whole world is outraged and disgusted by what’s happening in Gaza and the failure of powerful countries to put an end to it, and everyone knows the US can stop the tragedy, but it chose not to.

 The Starmer government can go further by telling the US president that the UK will recognise a Palestinian state, alongside France, at the UN annual meeting in September. Ten prominent members of the G20; China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, in addition to the permanent invitee, Spain, as well as dozens states across the world, have already recognized a Palestinian state, since it’s the only way to redress the injustice suffered by the Palestinian people for 8 decades, stabilize the Middle East and put an end to this mindless violence, once and for all.

The Gaza slaughter will be on the conscience of every conscientious human being for a long time to come, and it will certainly force a reset of the existing international order and the prevailing thinking on human rights, international law, democracy, freedom and international relations.

Will Kier Starmer, do it? He can and he should, if he really wants to achieve a success of this ill-conceived and badly-timed second state visit of this highly controversial American president. Failing that, Stramer will be viewed as weak, dithering, visionless and astray. His rivals, on both left and right, will gradually gain the upper hand. I, for one, do not wish to see the Labour Party back in the opposition so soon after its landslide election win, especially after the chaos caused by the Tories in their 14-year tenure, but it looks that Labour cannot complete its statutory five-year term if it continues at its current performance. Starmer need to show leadership and take action now. Successful leaders are those who can recognise an opportune moment, not those who keep dithering when faced with difficult choices.

https://x.com/alkifaey/status/1949123103675523269 

Europe Can Survive and Prosper without America

Hamid Alkifaey 

Russian President, Vladimir Putin, would never have dreamt that his Ukrainian adventure would end up in victory as it seems to have done today.

His adversaries in Europe and America are quarrelling among themselves and exchanging insults and accusations. One has accused Ukraine of starting the war, while describing President Zelensky, who was elected by 73% of Ukrainians as a dictator.  

 America, which in 2022 has raised the banner of supporting ‘democracy’ in Ukraine and ‘freedom’ in Europe, has now renounced this heroism. Instead, it has rushed into negotiation with Russia without any preconditions. As for Europe, which is under an immediate Russian threat, it looked so feeble that its leaders are queuing to make pilgrimage to Washington, to beg for sympathy.

British Prime Minster, Kier Starmer, who visited Washington this week, preceded his visit by announcing that the US is right in demanding that Europe pay for the cost of defending itself and ‘the comfort of the past’ is no longer available to Europe. French President, Emmanuel Macron has beaten Starmer to Washington, in an attempt to persuade Trump to keep the Western Alliance united in supporting Ukraine. Polish President, Andrzej Duda, was also in Washington last week, explaining his country’s dilemma. Poland is the most fearful of Russian threat to its territory, given the history of hostility between the two nations. Ukrainian president, Volodymir Zelensky, has already agreed to sign away a ‘deal’ on his country’s rare-earth minerals in order to secure US security guarantees. Still, those guarantees do not seem to be forthcoming. The newly elected German would-be chancellor, Friedrich Merz, will no doubt visit Washington in the earliest opportunity to present his case to President Trump.  

The reason for this alarm is not related to European inability to defend themselves. Rather, it’s their unpreparedness militarily to confront Russia, even though this security threat to Europe has loomed in the horizon for quite a while, at least since Trump’s first term, when the administration was overtly, and uncharacteristically, friendly to the Putin clique.

Europe has immense military and economic resources and it’s more than able to defend itself. Dependence on America for over 80 years was a strategic miscalculation that the Europeans should never have made. It’s true that the US has a mighty army, 1.1 million soldiers in active service, but Europe has almost 2 million soldiers in active service, and double this number in reservists.   

Ukraine itself has also manifested a huge ability in defending itself, even though it needs weapons and financial assistance to sustain the war. The number of Ukrainian soldiers in active service and reserve is 2.2 million, according to reliable estimates (Statista). Their number surpasses that of the US Army. The Ukrainians were heroic in defending their country and halting the Russian advance and they should be relied upon as a security backstop to Europe as a whole.

The US has nuclear weapons, so does Europe. Britain and France have among themselves 515 nuclear warheads. American nuclear warheads are also deployed in Europe, between Germany, Belgium, Italy, Holland and Turkey. Thus, America cannot abandon Europe unless it dismantles it military bases, and this doesn’t look a possibility in the near future.

The US military industry is highly advanced. True. But so is Europe’s. The industrial revolution started here in Europe; UK, Germany, France and Italy. German Leopard tanks, are among the most advanced in the world, so are the British Challenger and French Leclerc tanks. If they are no match American Abrahms, they are certainly stronger than the Russian T34 and T57.

European jet fighters (Eurofighter Typhoon), and British (Tempest), are also advanced. They are certainly better performers than the Russian fighter jets. Furthermore, the American highly developed Lockhead Martin fighter jets, are also manufactured in in the UK, Italy and Canada.

The USA has dominated international decisions through its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and the support of its European allies. But Europe has two permanent seats, which also carry veto rights. If the US abandons its European allies, it will lose UK and French support in the UN. The European should use their leverage over the US, which has ended up relying on the ‘quid pro quo’ principle, even when dealing with its staunchest allies.

Europe can rid itself of the US domination on international decisions, which have often conflicted with European policies, laws, interests and humanitarian commitments and aspirations. Many of the US’ policies have embarrassed Europeans, especially those starkly biased ones, and they are numerous.

On the economic front, Europe’s economy is the second largest globally. If we use the Purchasing Power Parity measure (PPP), the European GDP is $29tr, while the US’ is just over $30tr. If the UK’s  GDP (around $5tr in PPP terms) is added, the European economy will surpass that of the US.

It’s in the interest of Europe to liberate itself of American hegemony, politically, economically, militarily, and yes, ethically. US hegemony has marginalized Europe, and delayed its unification process. It has also embarrassed the Europeans internationally, especially regarding US’ position on human rights globally. The US has not recognised the International Criminal Court and often opposed its decisions. The European association with America has placed a heavy burden on Europe and restricted its ability to form its own policies and pursue its own interests, independent of the US.

This has also deprived Europe of many economic opportunities. On the top of that, the US imposes sanctions on countries it disagrees with, such as China, and requires European countries to apply those sanctions, even if they are detrimental to their interests.

In addition to weakening and isolating America, Trump’s current measures, which are mainly directed against US allies in the continents of Europe and America, will certainly oblige the Europeans to review their political calculations, strategic alliances and economic directions. This review will eventually lead to liberating Europe form American hegemony and enable it to take its own political and economic decisions in accordance with its strategic interests. This will benefit Europe and entice other countries to cooperate with it.

Europe has many potential strengths. A stable and internationally-trusted currency is one. This will enhance its credibility and economic viability across the world, especially among countries which do not trust the US, in Asia, Africa and South America. 

What Europe needs is coherence, cooperation and coordination of efforts among its states. It must get over its past rivalries and linguistic and cultural differences. The people of Europe should just feel as they are, one people, who share common fate, goals, and interests.

President Trump’s trade and defence threats against the Western Alliance, which America has led for 80 years, should act as a wakeup call to Europe, to follow independent policies that serve its interests. If Europe remains divided, it will stay weak before Russia or any other rising power. Europe needs to stand by Ukraine, urgently and wholeheartedly. If it lets Ukraine down now, the Russian threat will not stop at Ukraine’s borders.

Hamid Alkifaey

It looks that the Iranian attack on Israel on 13th April was somehow an open public event. Almost everyone knew the details of the attack, a few days before it happened. Even the approximate number of drones and missiles was known before Iran fired them.

This, in itself, reveals that Iran was in fact negotiating with multiple parties, directly or indirectly, on how this operation of ‘revenge’ might be executed. Indeed, informed sources said that Iran telegrammed the US and some Arab countries about its intentions.

Let’s now examine the operation in more detail. 300 drones, or so, were launched from western Iran on Israel. They were flying low and slow, which enabled Israel, supported by the UK and US, to bring them down even before they reached its borders.

The end result was no casualties and no serious damage to any target, if there was an intended one. If the drones were programmed to fly low and slow intentionally, it means Iran was not really serious about harming Israel and the whole operation was a show for public consumption. If that was their maximum speed and power, it means the Iranian military industry is mediocre, thus, the Iranian regime exposed its weakness before the whole world, let alone its declared enemies.

Now, let’s look at the implications of this theatrical Iranian ‘offensive’ and how it has helped Israel, and its right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu, and made it look like a victim before the world, which has been highly critical of its war in Gaza and the collective punishment it has inflicted on the Gaza people.

1- It has relegated the human tragedy in Gaza to a secondary importance in the priorities of the world’s governments and media. The talk has been ever since, not about the humanitarian disaster befallen the people of Gaza, but over the conflict between Iran and Israel and how it can be contained.

2- It has brought life into the dying government of Banjamin Netanyahu, who was under pressure from within Israel and outside it, to stand down, due to his mishandling of the Gaza war, and the failure to prevent Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7th 2023. Even the American Democratic Majority leader, Charles Schumer, called for his replacement. Now his popularity has gone up and his position is more secure.

3- It has led to an increased military and political support for Israel among Western nations, which were critical of Israel’s handling of the Gaza war, in fact they were embarrassed by it after initially declaring their support for Israel after the 7^th of October’s massacre. Now the US, UK, Germany and France have come to the help of Israel speedily. Even Iran’s friends and allies, China and Russia, are unhappy about the Iranian offensive.

4- It has made it possible for the US congress to pass the $26b US aid to Israel, which was not approved before due to differences among Republicans and Democrats.

5- It has provided proof to all, that Iran is weak militarily, economically and politically, despite its huge resources, population and area size, its important geopolitical position and economic potential. This long-awaited and vociferously bragged about offensive, was no more than a drab show that failed to convince even the staunchest of supporters.  

6- It has exposed the falsehood of Iran’s long-propagated claims of supporting the Palestinian people and its declared intent to liberate their occupied land, an issue that has been a central focus of the Iranian propaganda machine for 45 years.

The Iranian regime, since coming to power in 1979, has inflicted serious damage and harm on Iran itself, and all neighbouring countries, especially Iraq. It has only talked about its animosity to Israel publicly, while dealing with it clandestinely and buying arms from it during its war against Iraq, as revealed by Jack Straw’s book, ‘The English Job’.

It has set back economic and political progress in Iran and neighbouring countries for decades, yet it has emboldened extremist religion-based movements in the Muslim word, and given right-wing marginal religious parties in Israel ammunition to get stronger and grow their popular support within Israel and beyond.

The Palestinian people have suffered for so long under Israeli occupation. One of the reasons of this suffering is that other countries, such as Iran, have manipulated their plight for their own domestic political purposes. It’s a huge failure on the part of the international community, especially the US and UK, to be so incapable of helping Palestinians out of their misery, which both countries have contributed to, if not caused it in the first place.

The Palestinian cause is just, it’s a national issue for a people who have been forced out of their homeland and denied the right to establish their own state. It’s not a religious issue, nor should it ever have been. The Palestinian society is diverse; there are Muslims and Christians, Arabs, Jews and others.

Nor should it have been an Arab issue. It’s a Palestinian issue, that was wrongly Arabised and Islamised, both of which have served the Israeli extreme right, which propagated that ‘since it’s an Arab issue, the 22 Arab states should accommodate those Arab refugees (the Palestinians) amongst them’. That was one of the main reasons why the problem has not been addressed for 75 years.

 Most problems in the world have been resolved, and the Palestinian question could have been one among them, had it been left to the Palestinians themselves, who are very resourceful and capable people.

By unconditionally supporting Israel, even when it breaks international humanitarian law and occupies Palestinian land, and tolerating the meddling of the Iranian regime in the internal affairs of other nations, the Western world has not only discredited its long-standing claims of promoting freedom, democracy and the application of international law, but has also sown the seeds of hatred, violence and instability in the Middle East and the wider world. Israel breaks international law as a matter of course, discriminates against Palestinians, treats UN resolutions with contempt and kills Palestinian civilians, local and international journalists, UN personnel and relief workers. It has even accused UN agencies of involvement in terrorism!  

The Iranian regime, on the other hand, has used the plight of the Palestinians as a pretext to expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond, and spread its peculiar brand of Islam in the Muslim world, establishing armed militias in foreign countries, seizing ships, harbouring and assisting terrorists, attacking embassies, firing missiles on Iraqi cities, threatening Azerbaijan and other neighbouring countries, fomenting discord and hatred and misleading people across the region with its fiery revolutionary rhetoric, that’s broadcast through its numerous TV channels and other propaganda outlets.

These activities have destabilized the Middle East and sown chaos across the world. If left unhindered, the Iranian regime will cause more harm to the people of the region and damage to international peace.

Sanctions, imposed on Iran by the West, have harmed the Iranian people, not the regime. On the contrary, they are blowing air into the regime’s balloon, giving it reason to claim victimisation by ‘international arrogance’, for following ‘the divine path of God’! Iran has it in its constitution that its armed forces have a ‘Divine tasks’, and thus, has the right to intervene in other countries, with no respect for international law.

As long as this thinking persists, Iran will never be reconcilable with the international community. It’s the only theocracy in the world in the twenty first century. The Iranian people are no doubt fed up with this regime, that’s intruding on their lives and bringing nothing but wars and sanctions upon them. The Middle East is tired of Iran’s meddling in its affairs, where at least four countries are now suffering under Iranian influence. There will be more of the same if Iran doesn’t change course, and it won’t unless forced to do so.

The root cause of all current problems in the Middle East is the Palestinian issue. It can be resolved if the US and Western nations get serious about it. They have the power, resources and influence to succeed. If no solution to the Palestinian question is found, there will be more war, violence and instability, especially with the continuous unconditional support given to Israel by the US and Western nations, regardless of what it does, and in spite of universal recognition that it’s an occupier of Palestinian land.

The world needs to wake up to the dangers that this time bomb could unleash if it’s not timely defused. Any delay in finding a resolution to the problem would be callous and adventurous. The Palestinian people deserve better and the time to act is now.

 Hamid Alkifaey

11 October 2023

Seventy five years have passed since the founding of the State of Israel, and this has been accompanied by acts of killing and destruction in Palestine. Hundreds of thousands have been killed so far, civilians and soldiers, children, women and the elderly. Millions of Palestinians have been displaced, while the solution remains far afield.

The reasons for not finding a solution are numerous, including Palestinian and Arab disunity, misreading international positions, exaggerating the Arabs’ ability to resolve the conflict militarily, and the inability to address the world in a measured and calm language, which has painted a picture that is so different from reality, presenting the other side with many arguments that helped strengthen its positions, militarily and politically.

But there is another important reason for the continuation of the cycle of killing and destruction, which is the support Israel gets from major powers in the world, regardless of what it does, whether it’s the oppressed or oppressor, and we have seen this position repeated in the recent war between Hamas and Israel.

It is true that Hamas began the attack, but the world’s indifference to the Palestinian tragedy, and the absence of any solution to the problem on the horizon, makes violence an automatic occurrence.

America sends the aircraft carrier (Gerald Ford) to provide Israel with the necessary supplies to continue the war, and stands strongly by Israel, without uttering a word of sympathy for Palestinian civilians, who are suffering under the fire of Israeli bombing, and have nothing to do with igniting the war.

In Britain, the Israeli flag is raised illuminated on the Prime Minister’s Office building, for the first time in history, and the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, declared that the UK supports Israel unreservedly, without any reference to the injustice befalling the Palestinian people, during 75 years of Israel’s occupation of their land, or its violation of international law, its violation of human rights conventions, its killing of civilians, its continued construction of settlements, its continued trend to devour the land, and its rejection of any solution to the issue, even those proposed by the United Nations and approved by the international community, not to mention the numerous Arab peace initiatives.

Regardless of our position regarding Hamas, its extremist religious ideology, or the countries supporting it, members and followers of Hamas are Palestinians, who have been subjected to injustice, like the rest of the people of Palestine, whose cause the world has ignored, under the illusion that ignoring their cause will make them forget it and erase the crimes committed against them. The assumption is that as time goes by, the whole Palestinian question will just disappear, even though the issue of Palestine cannot be forgotten as it has religious, legal, humanitarian and historical dimensions.

Hamas was founded and grew after all efforts to establish peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis failed, and all negotiations to find a viable solution to the Palestinian question reached a similar fate. Palestinian concessions to Israelis were met with Israeli intransigence and extremism.

Other peaceful means did not succeed in restoring the Palestinian right, or part of it. The Palestinians, along with the Arab countries, agreed to Security Council Resolutions No. 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, which called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Palestinian territories, and then begin negotiations to establish a Palestinian state.

Regardless of the sterile controversy that took place over the interpretation of the two resolutions, and whether the definite article ‘the’, should have been used or not, and whether the wording of the article meant (the territories occupied in 1967) or (territories occupied in 1967), the word (occupied) should have settled the controversy. Otherwise, why does (occupied land) remain in the possession of the occupier, while it is occupied according to the text of the UN resolution?

But the continuing Israeli extremism and denial of rights, and the cruelty with which Israel has dealt with the Palestinians, even civilians, under successive governments, from Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, through Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, all the way to Benjamin Netanyahu, who is the most extremist Israeli leader and rejecter of Palestinian rights, since the founding of Israel, Palestinians were pushed into despair, with no peaceful solution in sight to their question, especially with powerful countries of the world standing by Israel, despite its repeated attacks on Palestinian civilians and its disregard to international law and human rights conventions.

The first Israeli leaders dreamt of a modest Jewish state, established on part of the land of Palestine, alongside a Palestinian state, and I remember what Moshe Dayan, the former Israeli Defence Minister, said to British television, in the late seventies, (We do not want all of Palestine, but rather a part of it, and we do not demand the whole of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is Arab), indicating that the Jews, who were living in Arab countries, have moved to Israel, and those, as Arab citizens, have the right to live on this land, and Arab countries must consider this part that Israel occupies as a land inhabited by Jewish citizens of Arab countries.

On the other hand, it is not right for us to keep blaming others without paying attention to our mistakes. The support of the Arab countries for multiple, warring Palestinian factions, instead of supporting the Palestinian cause under the leadership of the true representatives of the Palestinian people, was a devastating mistake, which led to multiple competing “liberation fronts” and to infighting among Palestinians themselves. The Arabs should have helped the Palestinians to unite, and there should have been a unified Palestinian leadership, enjoying the support of most Palestinians, while allowing different visions to be presented under one roof. Sufficient support had to be provided to the Palestinian cause, represented by its unified leadership.

But this did not happen. Rather, Arab states’ disputes were distributed amongst the Palestinian factions; they began to outdo each other in extremism, and if one of them inclined to accept a negotiated solution, the others confronted it, thwarted it, and accused it of treason. Thus, one opportunity after another was lost to find a practical solution to the issue, at a time when many global issues were resolved, from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to Northern Ireland, East Timor and Burma, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and South Sudan.

In wars and crises, national unity is an absolute necessity. In World War II, for example, a national unity government was formed in Britain led by Winston Churchill, with the participation of the Labour Party led by Clement Atlee and the Liberal Party led by John Anderson, while the Americans elected Franklin Roosevelt for four terms, continuing to rule for thirteen years, until his death in 1945. Currently, Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to form a government that includes opposition parties, because there is a crisis that concerns everyone, and partisan governments do not represent the entire population.

Acts of murder, kidnapping, torture, and resorting to violence are heinous crimes that deserve condemnation without the slightest reservation, regardless of who commits them. The world should apply one standard regarding violence against civilians, regardless of who the perpetrator is. When Hamas commits crimes, it should be condemned, as should Israel. It is not right that Hamas alone is condemned when it targets civilians, while Israel is excluded from condemnation at a time when it bombs residential neighbourhoods in Palestinian cities, noting that Israel is an internationally-recognized state and bears legal responsibilities for the people under its occupation, whilst Hamas is a political organization with an armed wing, and is not recognized by any country or international organization, and most countries of the world do not agree with its political ideology.

Regardless of the positions of governments, most people, even in America and Europe, sympathize with the residents of Gaza, the peaceful civilians, who did not commit any crime to deserve the indiscriminate bombing of their neighbourhoods, or the cutting off of electricity and necessary supplies, but rather they were always the recipient of horrors and crimes. Hamas does not represent the majority of the population of Gaza, and the countries of the world have to differentiate between Hamas and the residents of Gaza, most of whom oppose its political orientation.

Israel cannot live in peace while its existence is based on the oppression of others and the confiscation of their lands and rights. Stability and prosperity are not derived from sheer military force alone. France could not remain in Algeria for long, despite its powerful force that killed one million Algerians. Russia, and America later, could not remain in Afghanistan, despite having advanced military forces, even though there was a large segment of the Aghan population who supported their presence. America has provided military and financial support and training to its Afghan allies for twenty years, but it was unable to weaken the forces that rejected it, and this prompted it to leave.

The US could not stay in Somalia nor Lebanon, nor even Iraq, where it left hurriedly. What motivates America to support Israel, even when it violates international law and human rights conventions? How does Israel expect to establish normal relations with Arab and Islamic countries when it denies the Palestinians their right to establish their state, and continues to build settlements on their lands?

In Britain, many sympathize with the Palestinian people, but the bankrupt Conservative government, which is not expected to survive the next general election, stands with Israel, the powerful country with a powerful army, and does not express a single word of sympathy for its victims, who are largely civilians, women, children and elderly.

Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, said during his visit to a Jewish synagogue, “Hamas is a terrorist organization, and people should not support it, and whoever does will be held accountable”! But the strangest thing is that the Minister of the Interior, Suella Braverman, issued instructions to police commanders to consider “raising the Palestinian flag or chanting slogans calling for freedom for the Arabs” as a crime worthy of punishment, according to a report in The Guardian newspaper, on October 10.

The Palestinian people chose a peaceful solution, and their legitimate representatives signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, which stipulated a two-state solution, but Israel did not adhere to the Oslo Accords. Israeli extremists killed the godfather of the accords, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, after which the whole peace process was stripped of its meaning, through seizing Palestinian land, establishing illegal settlements, waging repeated wars on Gaza, and imposing a stifling siege on it. Now Israel is even objecting to other countries providing relief to the civilian population besieged in Gaza.

Hamas believes in armed struggle, and in this position it disagrees with the majority of Palestinians and Arabs, but what Israel is doing is potentially pushing more Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, and perhaps others across the world, to agree with Hamas, that peaceful solutions are not possible, with the presence of extremist Israeli governments, such as the Netanyahu government, that’s determined to confiscate more Palestinian land and rights.

What encourages Israeli extremism is the unlimited political and military support that Israel receives from the rich and powerful countries of the world in America and Europe. This support is one of the reasons for fuelling religious and political extremism in the Arab and Islamic worlds. It can be said that the more unconditional Western support for Israel, the more extremism and terrorism in the world, while the chances of security and peace diminish.

If the international community is serious about fighting terrorism and extremism, and spreading democracy and human rights, it must find an urgent solution to the Palestinian issue and put an end to the suffering of the Palestinian people, which has continued for so long. Otherwise, violence, terrorism and extremism will continue. If the opportunities for a free and dignified life for the Palestinians diminish, they will have no choice but to resort to violence, and this will generate more death and destruction.

Criminals stole $2.5bn from Iraq’s largest state bank in broad daylight. Nicolas Pelham follows their trail

The Economist/ 1843 Magazine: July 27th 2023 

On a scorching September day last year, Hussein Kanber Agha reached the front door of his house in central Baghdad. He had got in the habit of scanning the street for anything out of the ordinary before turning the key. In his free hand he clutched a tattered brown leather briefcase. There was a chance someone might kill him for its contents.

Kanber wasn’t used to acting as though he were in a spy film. A 49-year-old consultant with a passion for digital banking, he was born in Iraq but had spent much of his adulthood in Stockholm. He led a quiet, orderly life there: working, going to the gym and drinking coffee. Then, last summer, Iraq’s finance minister asked him to return to Baghdad and investigate rumours about a theft at Rafidain, the country’s largest state-owned bank.

One particular account at Rafidain presented a tempting target to those in the know. Oil companies (and other firms operating in Iraq) are obliged to pay tax in advance when they receive a contract. The tax authority keeps these deposits in Account 60032. Firms can claim a rebate if they end up making less profit than expected but the bureaucratic hurdles are extensive. Unclaimed rebates hang around for five years before reverting to the treasury. Over time hundreds of millions of dollars accumulated in Account 60032, where they sat, alluringly. Then in mid-2022 word trickled out that huge amounts of this money were being withdrawn.

In theory the finance minister could have asked one of the country’s half-dozen oversight bodies to investigate. But Iraq is home to powerful militias, each with its own political wing and business empire. They are known collectively as the factions, and they exert vast influence over every aspect of government. Bribery is rampant. Those who cannot be bought are threatened (“You will leave Iraq horizontal,” an official recalls being told when she refused to do one faction’s bidding). A political outsider was needed.

The accountants told Kanber they didn’t want anything more to do with the investigation. They were afraid of the consequences

Kanber – thin, slightly stooped, the kind of man who drove an old Kia – seemed the perfect choice. He came from one of Baghdad’s old merchant families, and had fled Iraq in 1992 at the age of 19 after Saddam Hussein’s thugs detained him at a checkpoint. He moved to Sweden, where he earned a master’s degree at the Stockholm School of Economics and worked for a Swedish bank. He was on track for a conventional life as a European businessman until America overthrew the Iraqi regime in 2003.

Like many in the diaspora, Kanber was excited at the prospect of living in a free Iraq. He quit his job and moved to Baghdad to set up a mobile-payment system. But over the next five years the city was ravaged by sectarian violence. At one point 40 bodies were turning up on the streets every day. Eventually Kanber gave up and returned to Sweden.

In 2021 he was back in Iraq working on a banking-reform project for usaid, America’s international development agency. While there he heard rumours that the tax authority’s account at Rafidain was being plundered. When the finance minister asked him to investigate in August 2022, Kanber, by then back in Stockholm, didn’t relish the prospect, but he felt a duty to see that the inquiry was done “properly”. Also, he was curious: “Wouldn’t you want to know, if there was a huge theft like this?”

Kanber suggested that the finance minister discreetly assemble a team of trusted lawyers and accountants, then flew to Baghdad to join them. When they met he told the group to go to Rafidain immediately with a letter from the minister requesting copies of Account 60032’s statements. He knew that convenient fires often break out in Iraqi record departments when investigations begin.
Kadhimi claims to have been distracted by COVID!!!!

The next day the team gathered in a conference room at the ministry of finance to examine the stack of print-outs. One of the accountants quickly spotted the two most important pieces of information: the balance at the start of the year and the most recent one. Account 60032 had been almost completely emptied.

The team called everyone they knew at the bank. Within a few hours their sources provided the names of five companies to whom the money had supposedly been transferred. None of them was a big oil firm. In fact, no one had even heard of them before.

At that point the lawyers and accountants told Kanber they didn’t want anything more to do with the investigation. It looked like looting on a huge scale, which meant at least one of Iraq’s murderous factions was likely to be involved. If Kanber wanted to dig further, he would have to do so alone.

First he had to prove that a theft had actually taken place. The tax authority, the nominal victim of the crime, denied that anything untoward had happened. Its balance sheets showed that all its money was still there, because technically no rebates had been claimed. Kanber needed to find out how and why the money had worked its way into the five companies’ accounts.

Iraqi state institutions, Kanber later told me, are profoundly opaque places. Records are incomplete; many officials have their own agenda. Yet there are some people working within them who simply want to do their job well. Kanber thought he could spot them by the way they dressed – if they didn’t wear brash clothes, they might be worth approaching. He had neither rewards nor threats to wield. But he believed some people might simply want to do the right thing.

“Your life is going to be threatened anyway, so you might as well be corrupt and make money”

To avoid attracting attention, Kanber met these middle managers in coffee shops and restaurants rather than at their offices. About a week into his investigation, one of his contacts sent Kanber a message saying that they had received a delivery that might be of interest. At the finance ministry the brown briefcase was waiting for him.

Kanber opened the briefcase when he got home. Copies of 247 cheques made out from Account 60032 to the five companies spread across the table and onto the floor. He spent hours sorting them into chronological order, the first dated September 2021 and the last August 2022. The document haul wasn’t proof of a fraud (though the amounts were often suspiciously round numbers), but it did irrefutably show where the missing funds had gone. Around $2.5bn, an amount comparable to the country’s entire health-care budget, had been diverted. It later transpired that it had been carried off in trucks in broad daylight. And the withdrawals had been approved by some of the highest officials in the land.

Modern Iraq is like a film set of a democratic country. The scenery looks right – a public-integrity commission, a supreme judicial council, a parliamentary ethics committee – but lacks solidity. In reality, one former official told me, the country is a “gangster land”. The institutions that ought to maintain accountability are often used to shake people down. Officials estimate that the quantity of money that has disappeared from the public coffers since 2003 exceeds $300bn.

Part of the reason for the extraordinary scale of corruption is the power-sharing system introduced by the Americans in 2003. The scheme, dreamt up by exiles while Saddam Hussein was still in power, divided the infrastructure of the state between parties claiming to represent each of Iraq’s main religious and ethnic groups. After Saddam was overthrown these groups plundered the country’s resources to spread patronage. Party bosses, many of them affiliated to militias, divided up the lucrative ministries among themselves through a process of horse- trading.

In 2015 popular frustration at corruption exploded into a series of protests. Thousands marched in Baghdad against the “thieves” in charge. The prime minister at the time, Haider al-Abadi, decided to appoint technocrats as ministers in an attempt to mollify the protesters. But the factions didn’t plan on relinquishing control; instead they found posts in government departments for their lackeys, who then bribed and bullied the ministers. In such circumstances, there is little incentive for anyone to stay honest. “Your life is going to be threatened anyway, so you might as well be corrupt and make money,” explained Suha Najjar, who worked for a government body until threats forced her to flee the country last November. “That’s why everyone is corrupt.”

On paper, Iraq is a rich country. It is one of the largest oil producers in the world, earning more than $115bn from last year’s exports. Yet little of this reaches ordinary people. Around the corner from the tax authority’s office is a slum where families are packed in eight to a room. When it rains, the rubbish-strewn alleyways flood with sewage. When it’s hot, the sun beats down on corrugated-iron rooftops, turning homes into ovens. Hospitals are so poorly maintained that they have been known to burst into flames. The country has the second-highest child mortality rate in the Middle East.

The political elite live in a different world. I once visited the home of an official at the tax authority: it dripped with fake Louis XIV gilt. There were gilded armchairs, gilded grandfather clocks and a gilded mantelpiece. The carpets were as thick as sheep’s fleeces.

Two big powers – Iran and America – loom over Iraq, waging a tug-of-war for influence

Enrichment is not the only motivating factor in politics. Ideology still counts. Two big powers – Iran and America – loom over the country, waging a tug-of-war for influence. Mustafa Kadhimi, the prime minister when Kanber was hired, was in the West’s camp: he used to live in Britain and maintained good relationships with the cia from his time as Iraq’s intelligence chief. Like many in his clique, he came from Iraq’s cosmopolitan elite and owned property in London. Pitted against him was a coalition of parties and militias loyal to Iran, known as the Fatah alliance. Representatives of this camp often bore the tell-tale signs of new money: shiny suits and overpowering cologne. Their second homes were in Iran.

Tension between the two sides had been building for many months by the time word of the heist surfaced. Sometimes this flared into violence. Kadhimi survived three assassination attempts, including an attack on his house by an explosive-laden drone in November 2021. mps from the opposing pro-Iran group “would come to my office and threaten me publicly in front of my employees with prison [and] death”, says Najjar, the former official.

Ehsan Abdeljabbar, the finance minister who hired Kanber, was also a member of Kadhimi’s Western-oriented camp. Abdeljabbar’s interest in the Rafidain case may not have been purely public-spirited. By the summer of 2022 the parliamentary coalition backing Kadhimi was disintegrating, which meant the Fatah alliance was in a position to appoint a new prime minister. The tax office was known to be controlled by Fatah and a scandal like this had the potential to undermine them, giving Kadhimi and his ministers a chance of political survival.

Abdeljabbar told 1843 magazine he was driven by the desire to expose wrongdoing and establish the truth. Whatever his motivations, he impressed on Kanber that he had to work with great haste, calling him several times a day to check on his progress. In mid-September, when Kanber received the briefcase, Abdeljabbar’s own situation looked precarious: Fatah were planning a vote of no confidence in him. Kanber not only needed to finish the report before that happened, he also had to produce enough documentary evidence that even the most partisan Iraqi mp couldn’t ignore it.

“This report is going to get butchered,” Kanber remembers Abdeljabbar telling him, warning that a single mistake, however small, would discredit the entire investigation. Kanber tried to anticipate what detractors might say. He drafted an urgent letter in Abdeljabbar’s name to the big international oil companies operating in Iraq – more than 30 of them – asking if they had claimed a rebate in the past year. Virtually all of them said no. He dug into the history of each of the five companies that had received cheques to see if there was any activity that might plausibly justify rebates of billions of dollars. There wasn’t – three of them had been registered just before the heist began.

Kanber wasn’t finished until October 10th, the eve of the no-confidence vote. In order for the report to have any political heft, it had to be formally presented to the finance ministry in the name of a relevant official. Who could he get to read the report, digest its consequences and agree to sign it in less than 24 hours? Kanber decided to go to the house of Abdul Sattar Hashem Ali Mawla, an official at the tax authority whom he’d known since childhood.

He turned up at Mawla’s home with the report on a usb stick. Mawla’s printer wasn’t working properly, and the two men stood awkwardly beneath the Shia religious texts lining the shelves of his study, as the pages sputtered out. Mawla read them and, after a long pause, scribbled his signature.

If all the stolen notes were stacked on top of each other, the pile would rise higher than Mount Kilimanjaro

The following morning, hours before the no-confidence vote, the report was delivered to the parliamentary speaker, the public-integrity commission and Kadhimi, the prime minister. “These [five front] companies do not have tax deposits and do not have a power of attorney from any third party for withdrawing tax deposits,” it read. “The withdrawals cannot be justified in any way whatsoever.” It named the owners of the five front companies: two of them were registered to a man called Nur Zuheir.

Iraqis were used to scandal, but the scale and brazenness of this theft shocked even them. Day and night, Iraqi news channels ran coverage of what they dubbed the “heist of the century”.

Abdeljabbar lost the vote anyway. Kanber booked a Qatar Airways flight back to Stockholm. He felt tense as he approached Baghdad’s international airport, as he knew that agents allied to Fatah had influence with security there. What if they knew about his role in the investigation and arrested him? In the end he passed through passport control without incident and flew out of the country that his report had left seething.

Nur Zuheir was 41 when he was arrested, but he looked younger. After his picture was splashed in the papers I heard Iraqis liken him to Pablo Escobar. He certainly bore a passing resemblance to the Colombian drug lord: fat, unshaven cheeks, drooping eyes and a self-confident swagger. Kanber’s report named two other businessmen as recipients of the tax authority’s money. But Zuheir was the only one people talked about. (When 1843 magazine approached Zuheir for comment on the allegations in this article he said that he was a law-abiding citizen, and vehemently denied them all, adding that he had never indulged in any crime.)

Zuheir came from Basra, a predominantly Shia province in southern Iraq where much of the country’s oil is produced and exported. A local academic described Zuheir to me as a mukhalas, or fixer: someone who made introductions to the right people to smooth the movement of goods and services. At some point, he moved to Baghdad to deploy these skills on a national level.

 Zuheir knew how to make friends quickly. The courtship would begin with a Rolex watch, said one politician on the receiving end of his largesse (she refused the gift). She heard from colleagues in parliament that a positive response to the present would typically be followed up with a visit from a middleman bearing wads of cash. These presents would be accompanied by requests to sign off on appointments and contracts.

I didn’t understand the scope of Zuheir’s influence until a few months after the scandal broke when I visited the tax authority’s office. It was a desultory place: the floors were covered with brown linoleum and the window frames were coated in dust. A clerk pulled me aside and showed me the door to the director-general’s office on the fifth floor. Zuheir used to visit several times a week, he said. Another source said that Zuheir parked his car directly outside the front door, a privilege usually reserved for the head of the tax authority alone, and walked in swinging his gold prayer-beads, leaving a pair of bodyguards at reception.

To issue large cheques from the tax authority required the signatures of at least 12 different officials. The process often took weeks, but Zuheir obtained his in a fraction of that time. According to two clerks who worked there, Zuheir personally cajoled, bribed and threatened employees in the tax authority to speed up the ponderous pace of operations.

There were other delays to contend with. The supreme audit board, an oversight body that was reasonably punctilious by Iraqi standards, was supposed to give permission before the tax authority issued large cheques. In the summer of 2021, a senior official asked that the board be relieved of this responsibility. This left the tax authority, as one Iraqi finance expert put it, “like a playground without teachers”.

The gossip among the Iraqi elite was that a lot of the heist money had ended up in Jordan’s capital, Amman

Now the heist could begin in earnest. When a request for a rebate cheque came in, men in Zuheir’s pay would bring the paperwork up to the fifth floor in leather-bound folders for the head of the tax authority to sign. On the ground floor was a branch of the Rafidain bank, where cashiers issued the cheques. Most of these were cashed immediately at a larger branch a few kilometres away.

Over the course of a year, Zuheir turned a sclerotic state bank into a model of efficiency. A state bank official told me that Rafidain normally processed about 2bn Iraqi dinars a day. On a single day during the heist this figure went up to 40bn. “Cheques for tens of millions were issued in 24 hours, and the funds [were made] available in cash the following day,” said an accountant who works regularly with the tax authority.

Withdrawing $2.5bn in cash in less than a year would be a logistical challenge in any country, let alone one whose highest-value banknote – the 50,000 dinar bill – was equivalent to about $35. If all the stolen notes were stacked on top of each other, the pile would rise higher than Mount Kilimanjaro. Trucks had to be used to ferry the heist money about.

The comings and goings were so obvious that the manager of a company that was meant to have a monopoly on transporting banknotes wrote to Rafidain in January 2022 expressing concern. Yet no one seems to have stopped the vehicles.

It’s not clear what happened to the money next. Some of it appears to have been spent in Iraq. Several politicians and officials told me about a cluster of properties that they believed Nur Zuheir had bought in the posh Mansour district, where he lived. But most of the cash, according to former security officials, was converted into dollars and taken overseas.

 Exporting suitcases full of dollars through Baghdad airport ought to have been hard. Most passengers board the plane only after five x-rays, two inspections by sniffer dogs and a body search. But there are two ways to pass through with minimal intrusion, an Iraqi spook told me. One is through the intelligence agency’s airport lounge. Unlike the dingy passenger hall, which dates back to the era of Saddam Hussein, this waiting room boasts clean white tiles, spotlights and walls lined with Iraqi art. Mercedes limousines wait outside to drive vip passengers to their private jets. The second way in is through a locked gate in the perimeter wall, where heavy loads usually enter.

Zuheir used both routes, according to an intelligence official. Security guards would wave him through to the intelligence agency’s lounge where he waited to board his private jet. Vans would drive through the gate to his plane. The spook says he once saw the floodlights on the runway cut out as eight vans rolled in. The lights only came on again ten minutes later, by which time the cargo had presumably been stowed. Zuheir made more than 20 trips abroad in 2021 and 2022, according to a parliamentary report. The gossip among the Iraqi elite was that a lot of the heist money had ended up in Jordan’s capital, Amman.

A former intelligence officer told me that when Zuheir got wind of Kanber’s investigation, he offered the finance minister, through an intermediary, tens of millions of dollars in exchange for abandoning the probe. (Other officials say that Abdeljabbar, the finance minister, had been looking for a cut and was turned down. Abdeljabbar denies any direct or indirect contact with Zuheir.) The report was delivered anyway, and two weeks later Zuheir received a tip-off that he was about to be arrested, according to a different intelligence officer working on the case. He rushed to the airport in a limousine and drove onto the runway where his plane was waiting, the officer said. But before it could take off, security forces burst in and arrested him. Zuheir was rumoured to have been moved from the airport prison to a “super vip” detention centre, complete with a swimming pool, though judicial authorities deny this.

“It’s an elite that shares the spoils. There are no good guys”

Shortly after Zuheir’s arrest Kadhimi was toppled as prime minister. The pro-Iranian camp appointed its own man, Muhammad Sudani, to lead the government. Publicly, Sudani embraced Kanber’s investigation and promised that no one would be spared the law. A month into his term, he gave a press conference flanked by two giant stacks of dinars, and announced triumphantly that he had recovered $125m from Zuheir, a small fraction of the missing billions.

Shortly afterwards Zuheir was released on a two-week bail. Officials said this was to help the authorities recover more funds. Months later he was still at large. When I visited Iraq this spring, I drove past Zuheir’s mansion in Mansour. The lights were on. Iraqis I spoke to claimed he had been spotted in Dubai, Amman and London. In April 2023 the courts even unfroze his assets. One of Sudani’s associates told me the prime minister had no choice. “If he hadn’t released Nur Zuheir he’d have lost his head.” When 1843 magazine asked Sudani about the release of Zuheir, a spokesman said it was a decision by the courts, not the government, adding that charges against Zuheir had not been dropped.

The man at the pinnacle of the Iraqi court system is Faiq Zidan, president of the supreme judicial council. Zidan inspires fear. A former ambassador and a former Iraqi intelligence officer both told me that he had the power to make cases disappear (Zidan denies this, saying his role is “administrative only”). He was one of two people in Iraq I was told to avoid crossing. “He has immense powers,” said a former official. “This is very dangerous.”

In person Zidan is friendly enough. He gave me a lengthy account of the state of the case. Zuheir has been allowed to travel so that he could liquidate his overseas assets and pay back the Iraqi state, Zidan said. Apparently this has already resulted in around $270m being recovered. Surprisingly Zidan also seemed minded to give Zuheir the benefit of the doubt, saying that he may have been a genuine agent for companies seeking a rebate.

It wasn’t immediately obvious why Zidan would be trying to make life easier for Zuheir, if that’s what was happening (Zidan rejects the suggestion of any irregularity in his conduct). Men like him don’t do the bidding of fixers from Basra. Current and former Iraqi officials had another explanation for the decision to release the heist’s prime suspect. “Zuheir was just a puppet,” said one. “A patsy,” said another. “He was a frontman,” said a third. But for whom?

Sudani’s government soon began to take the case in a new direction. Officials seemed to shift their focus away from Zuheir and instead issued warrants for the arrest of the people involved in exposing him. (According to a spokesman for Sudani, Zuheir had confessed to getting help from senior figures in the previous administration.) As they came under scrutiny, members of Kadhimi’s camp started contacting me. They were adamant that Zuheir had been an agent for Sudani’s backers: the factional bosses with links to Iran. “Don’t let any of those motherfuckers get away with it,” one told me.

Zuheir parked his car directly outside the front door, a privilege usually reserved for the head of the tax authority alone, and walked in swinging his gold prayer-beads

One member of Kadhimi’s team who troubled me was Haitham al-Jubori, a finance adviser. I had learned from his friends that Jubori used to employ Zuheir as a personal assistant when he was head of the parliamentary finance committee. According to an Iraqi intelligence official who knows Jubori personally, Zuheir would call the owners of businesses that the committee were looking into and offer to suspend investigations in exchange for payments. The operation allegedly brought in around $200,000 a month. According to a letter seen by 1843 magazine, it was Jubori who had recommended the tax authority should be allowed to issue large cheques without the oversight of the government auditing body.

Jubori did not respond to 1843 magazine’s attempts to reach him for comment, but he told Middle East Eye, a news site, that he had simply proposed that the supreme audit board should stay within the limits of its statutory role. He was arrested soon after Sudani took over. Kadhimi’s allies suggested I shouldn’t read too much into the fact that Jubori had been advising them (“When you have 200 advisers, sometimes the lowlife slip in,” explained one.)

Another question I had about Kadhimi related to the flights. Baghdad airport fell directly under the prime minister’s authority. Though technically under a travel ban for his alleged involvement in a previous fraud, Zuheir flew freely in and out of the country during the period the money was being withdrawn from Rafidain. How had Kadhimi let this happen?
                                                              When he was asked about Haitham Al-Jubori, Kadhimi claimed he didn’t know him!

 Kadhimi suggested we meet at the Grove, a five-star hotel with a plush golf course just outside London. Kadhimi had relocated to Britain for his safety in November 2022. He arrived at our meeting in a black limousine. Trump had stayed here, he reminded me as we sat down to sip mocktails on the flagstone terrace. Kadhimi was quiet and courteous. Though he speaks English he preferred to conduct our interview in Arabic, mumbling as though in a deliberate attempt to avoid saying anything quotable.

When I asked about Jubori, Kadhimi replied that he didn’t know him. He then corrected himself and admitted it was a “dark” reality that Jubori had been appointed. He presented himself as a passive victim of circumstance. Yet he had been the prime minister, and for most of his tenure remained head of the country’s intelligence service as well. He must have had some power, and had at least an inkling about what was going on. I tried again. Hadn’t his security apparatchiks smoothed Zuheir’s path through the airport? Kadhimi dodged the question. “First we have to look at the banking officials,” he replied.

His justification for not spotting the heist morphed throughout our conversation. At the start, it was his staff’s fault. Then he’d been distracted by covid-19, and the plunge in oil prices that ensued, and the Trump administration’s confrontational attitude to Iran. It wasn’t that much money, he insisted, compared with the hundreds of billions lost to corruption since 2003. It was definitely not true that most of the money had disappeared through the airport. A phrase he kept on using was “100% no”.

Later I wrote to Kadhimi and mentioned a story I’d heard. A contact of mine is related to an Iraqi politician who, in May 2022, needed urgent medical treatment abroad. According to my contact, Kadhimi had offered the politician a seat on a private plane at his disposal. When the politician got on board, he was surprised to discover Zuheir there. The plane dropped the politician in Amman and Zuheir flew on to Beirut, my source said. Kadhimi wrote back categorically denying the claim, which he said was “baseless”. (In the same letter he said that Jubori had been hired as a technical expert not an adviser, and had been reprimanded at the time for inflating his role.)

The president of the supreme judicial council was one of two people in Iraq I was told to avoid crossing. “He has immense powers,” said a former official. “This is very dangerous”

My dealings with Kadhimi were frustrating. Zuheir must have had help at the highest levels. The two main factions each insisted that it came from the other one. Then it dawned on me. Why shouldn’t players from both sides have had a stake in the operation?

Sajad Jiyad, a political analyst, told me he reckoned that seven factions from across the spectrum had reaped profits from the heist. “Iran-backed, us-backed, self-styled reformers, supporters of the status quo – all factions benefit from corruption schemes,” he said. “These opponents fight each other in public but work together in private to enrich themselves, regardless of political and ideological positions.” A Western consultant in Baghdad pointed out that some of the militia leaders who had fought each other sent their children to the same exclusive Baghdad schools. “It’s an elite that shares the spoils,” he said. “There are no good guys.”

In the murk of Iraqi politics, Kanber, the Swedish-Iraqi investigator, always seemed to be a beacon of clarity. He spoke with precision, in measured terms. People that I respected respected him. (Ali Allawi, a former finance minister, described him as “probably the only honest person left in Iraq”.) His nerdiness was endearing – the wallpaper on his laptop was a jigsaw puzzle of the Stockholm School of Economics, with one piece missing.

Yet as I went deeper into the case, some things about Kanber didn’t seem to add up. He was supposedly bent on rooting out corruption, but he displayed great deference to Ehsan Abdeljabbar, the finance minister who had hired him. This confused me, as several people had told me that Abdeljabbar himself had been caught up in cases of alleged corruption in the past when he was at the oil ministry. (Abdeljabbar said that the cases had been launched by someone with a grudge against him and that 90% of them were closed.)

 Sometimes Kanber gave such detailed answers to my questions about the case I felt like I was reliving his investigation in real time. At other times he was inexplicably reticent. I never understood his apparent lack of interest in the ultimate destination of the stolen money. “I didn’t follow up,” he would say nonchalantly.

Then, in June, a disturbing email popped up in my inbox. An Iraqi researcher in Washington had compiled a short dossier of unverified material on Kadhimi, Kanber and others. It implied they were part of a network that had “enabled” the heist. According to the dossier, Kanber was not quite the outsider I’d taken him for – his stepfather was Kadhimi’s mentor. The dossier suggested that Kanber had played a role in the appointment of the director-general of Rafidain bank shortly before the heist. In a surreal twist it also claimed that a man once reported to have been arrested in connection with a previous fraud at Rafidain was Kanber’s first cousin.

We met in a café near Oxford Street in London a couple of days later. Kanber’s stamina for discussing the technical elements of banking, fuelled by nicotine pouches and cappuccinos, remained undimmed. But when I brought up the allegations that had been circulating, his courteous phrases gained a sharper edge. He said he was well aware of the dossier’s existence, which he described as amusing, though he didn’t look very amused. He dismissed its allegations as “fanciful”.

Some however turned out to be true. Kanber admitted that he knew Kadhimi well, but insisted he didn’t get on with his stepfather, and they weren’t part of a cosy cabal. He had been involved in the recruitment of some new staff at Rafidain bank after an earlier scandal, but he hadn’t made the sole decision on appointments. Kanber didn’t dispute that Hamid al-Najjar, the man associated with the earlier fraud case, was his cousin; in fact he had tried to start a bank with him before Najjar’s legal troubles began. If you wanted to do business in Iraq, he told me, you didn’t have much choice about the kind of people you worked with.

Robbing a state bank and spending the money isn’t a fair or accountable mechanism for distributing wealth – but it is swift

The encounter made me feel miserable. I’d always liked Kanber. No one questioned the findings of his report. His readiness to subject himself to a journalist’s questions at all hours of the day was not the behaviour of someone with something to hide. He seemed genuinely worried about his safety if he ever went back to Iraq, which wouldn’t bother someone with powerful friends. (“I’m a tissue. They’ll throw me out like this,” he said, flicking his wrist.) But the interview didn’t dispel my sense that there was a lot about him I didn’t know. Kanber seemed depressed too. “In retrospect,” he said wearily as we wrapped up, “I think we wasted six months of our lives.”

The Iraqi people certainly didn’t seem appreciative. Although the phrase “heist of the century” buzzed through Iraqi social media, there has been surprisingly little pressure to bring its perpetrators to justice. In 2019, during the last big demonstration against corruption, security forces fired live rounds into the crowd. Perhaps Iraqis were done protesting. A few people told me that the heist might actually have been good for Iraq, as it injected dormant funds into the economy. “It’s better to spend it in Baghdad than to leave it in an account,” an Iraqi businessman reasoned.

This spring Baghdad looked brighter than I had ever seen it. When I first visited Iraq in the last months of Saddam’s dictatorship, the city was drab and dun. Its buildings were the shade of the desert that surrounds the city.

Now it was bursting with colour. New apartment blocks were sprouting up everywhere. Restaurants were opening. Pavements that America’s tanks and Humvees had ground to dust were finally being rebuilt. The shrines of the Shia saints, built of bare brick under Saddam, glistened with thousands of crystals. At least some of the money fuelling this is likely to have trickled down from the heist. Robbing a state bank and spending the money isn’t a fair or accountable mechanism for distributing wealth – but it is swift.

It seems unlikely that any of the heist’s real beneficiaries, whoever they are, will face justice. The miasma of guilt that clings to the entire political elite means there is little accountability for individuals. Though Sudani’s office insists it is pursuing the investigation vigorously, there have been few announcements since his press conference last year. “Let’s be realistic,” Kadhimi told me as we finished our mocktails in London. “This money will kind of go into thin air. It will disappear, disappear.”

You can watch the accompanying film of Nicolas’ investigation here.

Nicolas Pelham is The Economist’s Middle East correspondent

illustrations: mike mcquade

https://www.economist.com/interactive/1843/2023/07/27/the-baghdad-job-who-was-behind-historys-biggest-bank-heist

Treacherous Life

This piece was written in memory of my dear friend Saad Al-Jadir who died on 17th July 2023

M

Hamid Alkifaey*

Creed is sacrosanct; no one has the right to interfere with people’s beliefs or impose their beliefs on others, it’s a basic human right guaranteed by laws, norms and religions themselves. The Qura’an, for example, has many verses to this effect such as verse 29 of the Cave Chapter “The truth is from your Lord. Whoever wills—let him believe. And whoever wills—let him disbelieve” and Verse 99 of the Younis Chapter “Had your Lord willed, everyone on earth would have believed. Will you compel people to become believers”?.

But people do worry if the beliefs of others threaten social peace or compromise the sovereignty of their countries. Thus, it’s their right to object, especially when a few of them share those beliefs which do not conform to reason, public interest, and international law.

Some armed groups in Iraq and other countries believe in a historical narrative that ‘a man from Khurassan (Iran) will emerge to pave the way for the Mahdi (saviour) by establishing a righteous state. They think Al-Khurasani, as the he is known in Shia books, is in fact the current Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei! This means, that an Iranian politician has now attained a mythical religious status outside his country where he can manipulate people’s feelings to his advantage. 

The idea of a ‘saviour’, Mahdi or Messiah, is common in many religions. It’s an expression of hope for the future, but in the Shia narrative, the Mahdi is the 12^th infallible Imam, who was born 1200 years ago, and has been absent ever since, but he will emerge when the time is right. No problem so far, but some Shia groups believe there must be an effort to prepare the grounds for the Mahdi as a way of enticing him to reappear and this effort is led by (Khurasani) who is non-other than Ali Khamenei!  

Notwithstanding people’s right of belief, it becomes dangerous if they carry arms to achieve their goals and kill or silence those they disagree with. Iran makes no secret of its support for these groups; supplying them with weapons, money, plans, ideas and religious legitimacy. If Iran’s leader is considered a spiritual leader, it means these groups will do anything against their own country if he orders them to do so. Iran is exploiting people’s innocent religious feelings in order to destabilise other countries. Ironically, Iran had no such groups within its borders. It only supports armed groups in other countries.

A modern state would not allow armed groups to operate on its soil. On the contrary, it cracks down on them and puts them in jail. Weapons are exclusively held by the official representatives of the state, which are normally members of the army and security forces. This is what any state does, regardless of the type of its political system. If a state allows armed groups to operate on its soil for whatever reason, such as the existence terrorist groups, as was the case in Iraq when it was fighting ISIS in 2014-2017, it would not allow them to take orders from another country, especially when these orders are religiously binding. Iraqi politicians, especially those in government, face a real challenge. These groups operate on Iraqi soil, draw salaries from the Iraqi state, yet their activities undermine the state and violate its sovereignty.

If Iraq falls in the hands of these groups, the matter won’t end there. The long-term plan of these groups, and their backers, is to move into other countries since the Mahdi ‘must rule the world’ in their creed. Sheikh Salah Obaid, a member of the Lebanese Hezbollah, said once he believed in the ‘World Islamic Republic’, led by the Mahdi.

There are now dozens of armed groups who believe in the Mahdi. They also do what it takes to make their beliefs come true as were told in old history books. These groups, by their nature, do not conform to the laws, rules and norms of a modern state. If they really apply what they believe in, Iraq would end up torn apart by division and civil war. As a result, it would pose a serious danger to its people, neighbouring countries and perhaps the larger world.

Once again, no one has a problem with people’s beliefs, provided they remain private and peaceful. The problem stems from these groups’ allegiance to Khamenei who they regard as the deputy of the Mahdi. This poses an imminent danger to Iraq. All Iraqis, those believe in a civil state in particular, are urged to be vigilant.

These groups hold a religious creed that runs counter to the very basics of the modern state and international law, just like ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda. They are also armed, trained and believe in achieving their aims by violence. If they continue to pursue their aims through kidnapping and assassinations, why should the state accommodate them and pay their salaries? If Iraqis yielded to their terror, regional states would certainly resist and respond accordingly. The international community would not cohabitate with groups that seek to impose their esoteric beliefs by violence. They will be treated like other terrorist groups. The result might be another war that will not leave a stone unturned.

The interests of Iraq, regional countries and the international community, require that Iraqis respond to this imminent danger that threatens their country and society. These groups do not currently make public their detailed plans, but we know where they are heading to. Appeasing dangerous groups, and their backers, will lead to a catastrophe. There must be concerted efforts now to ban these groups, strip them of their arms and try their leaders for the crimes they have committed in Iraq and elsewhere. Iranian leaders must be held accountable for supporting violent groups outside their borders.

*Iraqi Writer and Academic

A Discussion with Hamid Alkifaey, Author of ‘Failure of Democracy in Iraq’

Foreign Policy Concepts
4th June 2019

Interview with the author of ‘Failure of Democracy in Iraq’, Dr Hamid Alkifaey

 1- What led you to write your book? 

I explained in the introduction what led me to write the book. I opposed the dictatorship in Iraq since the mid-seventies and was engaged in exposing the regime’s dictatorial ways of ruling Iraq, wasting Iraqi wealth on weapons and foolish and brutal wars and the horrors it committed against the Iraqi people. When the regime fell in April 2003, I was part of the effort to establish democracy in Iraq. I was the spokesman of the Iraqi Governing Council (GC), which was the first post Saddam Iraqi institution that formed the first government which worked alongside the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority). I was party to the TAL (Transitional Administrative Law) which paved the way for the first free elections in Iraq’s recent history.

I run in the first democratic elections to the National Assembly and the first parliament, so I had first-hand account of what happened. I saw in my own eyes the violations of the electoral process and how those involved in the democratic process had their own different understandings of democracy that often undermined the very idea of democracy. I saw politicians who had always claimed to be pious, act in deceitful ways, lie and manufacture false stories about their political opponents, etc, etc.  I saw them break the law to achieve political gains. I saw anomalies I never thought I would ever see. This is what led me to study all patterns of democracy and find out whether the process in Iraq really conforms to real democracy.

 2-Iraqi democracy is still going on with frequent elections and new governments formed after every election since 2003. Why do you think it has failed?

Elections on their own are no testimony to the presence of real democracy. Elections are held everywhere in the world these days. Saddam Hussein used to hold elections, so did Robert Mugabe. Mahathir Muhammed got ‘elected’ at the age o 93! There are doubts whether those elections were true reflections of popular will. The Iraqi public had been very unhappy with the leaders, but the same leaders get elected again and again! So, it’s either they rig the elections or, the electorate are easily deceived. In either case, there is a real defect in the Iraqi democracy. Iraq simply has a defective democracy. Also, there is no independent and professional media to inform the people of the real issues so that they go to the ballot boxes with an informed opinion. In the first election, Shia voters were told by their religious leaders to vote for List 169. It was considered as a religious duty. Many people obeyed and voted. So they did not vote according to their own wishes or consciences, as individuals with different opinions. They voted according to their religious mentors’ wishes. The same happened in subsequent elections, albeit in more indirect ways, and I quoted one of the most influential preachers in Iraq, Sheikh Jaafar Al-Ibraahimi, who said he promoted religious parties which were unknown to the electorate and he did that on behalf of the religious establishment. Later on, those same parties held on to power ever since. One of the signs that democracy is working is when power transfers to the opposition at least twice. This has not happened once in Iraq. 

  3-Islamists are the main political forces and it seems logical that power will remain in their hands because they do represent the views and interests of the majority? Does this sound like a success for democracy, or a failure?

If you take the results of elections seriously, this seems to be the case, but in reality it’s not. People are unhappy with Islamist parties because of their corruption and failure and many of them voted against them but the electoral system was changed and manipulated by Islamists for their benefits. Islamists didn’t serve the interest of the people who voted for them. They served the interests of the leaders and their families. One of the reasons of the failure of democracy which I listed in the book was the failure of secular parties to form a united front and field strong and credible candidates in the elections. In the secular camp, there were many small parties which suffered from rivalries and infighting. The biggest was led by Ayad Allawi who was supported by the US but he was no astute politician nor a real democrat, so he ended up alienating even his closest allies. Yes, Islamists were able to ‘win’ elections by fair means and foul, staying in power despite their overt and widespread corruption and failures. They certainly do not represent the majority of the people nor do they have a real constituency that they seek to serve. They have so far served their leaders and their families and this is obvious to everyone in Iraq.

 4-As you point out in your book, the Iraqi society is divided. So, it’s natural that this division is reflected in the parliament and government. What are the key challenges here? 

Political divisions are normal in a democracy but what I pointed out in the book was the racial, regional and sectarian divisions. Islamist Shia parties, in particular, deepened the sectarian division among the people on purpose and exploited it to their advantage. They used sectarian rhetoric and they made up stories about Sunni or Shia dangers in order to frighten their electorate and push them into voting for them. Nationalist patriotic politicians and real democrats do not divide their people in order to stay in power and make financial gains. They should aim to strengthen the coherence of the people. Division, other than the political one, weakens the country and that’s why Iraq has been weakened by sectarianism and infighting. All political parties were fighting among each other over who gets a bigger share of the spoil that comes with political power; there is a deeper rift among Islamists themselves than between them and other parties, despite the fact that, in theory at least, there are no fundamental ideological differences among them. But they have managed to unite during elections in order to gain power and then divide the loot among themselves later on. In addition to sectarian and ethnic divisions, Iraq has a “stateness” problem because of the irredentist tendency among the Kurds in the north. No real democracy can be established in the presence of irredenta. The Kurdish issue must be settled once and for all before we can talk of a real democracy in Iraq. This is another significant challenge. There is also the rentier economy which is not conducive to creating a real democracy since it gives huge financial power to the incumbent and makes people totally dependent on the state for their livelihoods. The Sunni-Shia division is not deep in Iraq since both communities have a common ethnic, cultural and national identity. Islamist parties tried to deepen the Shia-Sunni divide, which benefited certain individuals from both sides, but the division doesn’t look solid nor permanent and it will disappear if secular parties become popular.    

 5-It’s difficult to get religion out of politics, as you seem to suggest in your book. Is there any middle ground to accommodate religious beliefs in an evolving democracy like that of Iraq? 

In a democracy, political parties have political and economic programmes, not religious programmes. Politics is about serving the people in this life, not the hereafter. So, religion should not really be relevant to politics, not in Iraq nor anywhere else. If an individual wishes to follow religious dictates, that is his/her legitimate choice that should relate only to his/her personal life, not turn into a way to govern the country or define that person’s role in public life. Individuals in power should be defined based on what they can offer the people in terms of services and jobs. In a democracy, people are free to practice their faith, but religion must not be exploited to gain political advantage as this encourages what I called in the book (political religiosity) which is fake and harmful. In Iraqi elections, most politicians have used religious rhetoric, even secular politicians. True religious people do not exploit the religious feelings of their fellow citizens for political gains. Under democracy, religions and religious practices are protected by law, so the people do not really need corrupt politicians to tell them about their religion. People know what to do and who to turn to if they need religious advice. They have their real religious leaders to turn to, not politicians who should be doing their duties as politicians.

 6-Do you think Iraq has the capacity to develop into a Western-style democracy? 

Yes, I think Iraq could become truly democratic but only if certain conditions are met. The first is the people of Iraq should insist on true democracy and they deserve it after having lived under a vicious dictatorship for so long. There is now a huge disappointment among Iraqis about democracy. If this trend continues, people’s commitment to democracy will further weaken, as happened in Egypt, and once this happens, undemocratic forces will exploit it and attempt to seize power. Second, the democratic world, especially the US and EU, should assist Iraq to improve the quality of democracy. Iraq does need the assistance of the US and EU in order to stay on track and develop its democracy. Iraqi democracy now exists in a hostile environment and it may not survive without political and economic support from western powers. Iraq is a medium-sized country with a population approaching 40 millions. Politicians should be competing on how to turn Iraq into a modern democratic viable state with a modern economy. Such a state can play a positive political and economic role in the region, and, as a democracy, it will be part of the democratic western world, just like Japan and South Korea in South East Asia. Democracy has so far failed but this failure is not permanent. It could succeed if the international community supports Iraq to stay independent and free of foreign influences. It’s not in the interest of the West nor the Middle East if democracy in Iraq fails.

 7-You blame the Americans for lack of commitment, but don’t you think this is unfair because the US sent its army to bring down a dictatorship and establish a democracy? What more should the US have done?

US brought down the dictatorship but didn’t really have any commitment to democracy. It wanted a democracy that serves its short-term objectives. It rushed the country into elections when there were no democratic institutions. Democracy needs civil society, economics society, political society, usable bureaucracy and a functioning judicial system. None of that existed in 2005 when the first elections were held. Iraq suffered from irredenta and the US didn’t attempt to sort this out even though the Kurds were and still are its allies. Iraq suffered from deteriorating services, deep poverty, lawlessness, and very powerful insurgency, thanks to the US inappropriate policies. Policies such as the dissolution of the Iraqi army and police, Deba’athification and declaring Iraq as an occupied state were instrumental in creating the chaos we saw after 2003. They strengthened the violent insurgency, armed groups and militias rather than the forces of democracy. On the top of the unemployment that already existed, the US made one million armed and trained Iraqi soldiers and one million Iraqi Ba’athists unemployed. Instead of finding solutions to the existing problems, the US created more problems and refused to invest money in Iraqi stability. Paul Bremer refused to reinstate former political prisoners and employees dismissed by the former regime under the pretext of following austere measures and trying to introduce market economy. US ended up paying half a trillion dollars to fight back insurgency which could have easily been avoided had sectarian forces been kept away. It was sectarian forces that did so much to agitate the insurgency. Instead of cooperating with the US-appointed Governing Council, Bremer constantly sought to undermine it and make it look weak before the Iraqi people. US mistreated Iraqi political forces and pushed them to seek alliance with Iran, Turkey and the Gulf states or carry arms against it. Even former US allies such as Ayad Allawi and Ahmed Chalabi turned against it. It allowed militias and religious parties to operate when it could have easily prevented them. You cannot have a democracy under armed religious and separatist parties. This is obvious to everyone. The US is to blame for most of the problems.

 7-In all candor, do you believe that Iraq was ready for democracy as you claimed in your articles and speeches prior to the fall of the Saddam? Is it ready now?

Democracy is not the default mode of humanity as John Dunn eloquently said. It was never established over night in any country. It’s a process that needs a lot of work. As I mentioned earlier, there are several preconditions that must exist for democracy to be successful. All these didn’t exist in Iraq in 2003, but they could have been created in 5 years and that’s what the US could have done. Democracy needs sponsorship. It wouldn’t have succeeded in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Eastern Europe and Latin America if it wasn’t for US and EU’s steadfast support. Yes, I was perhaps enthusiastic in my support for democracy and still am because I do think that democracy is possible in Iraq particularly. Don’t forget that in 1990, Samuel Huntingdon listed Iraq and Iran as having achieved the economic standard that qualified them to introduce democracy. I admit that many events were unforeseen. Because I lived in the UK for 23 years prior to the fall of the regime, I didn’t know in detail about the changes that Iraqi society went through. Harsh UN sanctions against Iraq for 12 years brought the country to its knees and all its institutions were dysfunctional. All these developments were not to be accurately gauged by Iraqi exiles like myself, unfortunately of course. Still, I think democracy could have been established gradually over a ten-year period had there been a strong US commitment to it.

https://foreignpolicyconcepts.com/a-discussion-with-hamid-alkifaey-author-of-failure-of-democracy-in-iraq/

Inconclusive Elections Leave Iraqis Searching for Compromise

by Hamid Alkifaey

Although the May 12 Iraqi parliamentary election was the country’s fifth since 2005, it was remarkably different from the previous ones in many ways. For the first time since the beginning of the democratic process in Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in 2003, Iraqi electoral lists, by and large, did not use sectarian, tribal, or regional concerns for political advantage. According to the campaign rhetoric of all lists, even the previously sectarian ones, the election was about building a modern democratic Iraq that’s strong, civil, free of corruption, and fair to all its citizens. It’s questionable, however, if these groups will keep their promises, especially those known for corruption, if they do come to power once again.

Notwithstanding this shift, most of the Iraqi electorate decided not to vote, perhaps believing that however they voted, the “same old faces” would come back to the scene. Voter turnout, around 45 percent, was the lowest in the country’s democratic history, despite the presence of a multitude of distinct choices in candidates. On the Islamist side, the old lists, albeit with many new names, were competing in full force: Sairoon, or Marchers, led by Muqtada al-Sadr with his new allies, the Iraqi Communist Party, won 54 seats; Fatah, or Conquest, led by the head of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, won 47 seats; Nasr, or Victory, led by incumbent moderate Islamist Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, won 42 seats; State of Law, led by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, won 25 seats; and Hikma, or Wisdom, led by cleric Ammar al-Hakim, won 19 seats.

While Fatah, Hikma, and State of Law are backed by Iran, Sairoon and Nasr present themes that support a popular Iraqi dynamic that is against corruption and for a strong independent state that enjoys good relations with all neighboring countries, including Iran, and the international community. Both lists are newly formed, although the candidates are not necessarily new.

On the secular side, the Wataniya coalition, led by Ayad Allawi, dominated, although it won only 21 seats, the same as in the last election. Other secular lists, such as Civility (which won two seats), Civil Democratic Alliance (which won one seat), and provincial lists in Anbar (which won five seats), Salahuddin (with two local lists, one won seven seats and the other one seat), and Nineveh (with two local lists, one won three seats, while the other won two seats) are largely secular.

The results of the elections are inconclusive, leaving all lists, great and small, a lot to play with. Due to the multiplicity of lists, there will be hard and lengthy bargaining time before an agreement to form a parliamentary coalition can be reached.

Each list has a role to play since the largest, Sairoon, has only 54 seats. Forming a new government requires a simple majority of 165 seats, and this will require at least four major lists. But in Iraq, political coalitions tend to include representatives from all lists, otherwise they will disappear from the political map. Iraqis won’t vote for candidates who have no leverage or influence.

There are still sectarian lists in the sense that they are made up of all-Shia or all-Sunni members. Fatah, State of Law, and Hikma are all-Shia lists, while Qarar, or Decision, and other small regional lists in the provinces of Anbar, Salahuddin, and Nineveh, are all-Sunni. But the other major lists, Sairoon, Nasr, and Wataniya, are cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic.

A potential alliance to form a government would be Nasr with the Sairoon and Wataniya lists, together with the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party, which hold 43 seats between them, and the Sunni regional lists in Anbar, Salahuddin, and Nineveh. A possible list to add would be the all-Sunni seemingly secular Qarar list. But this means excluding the pro-Iranian Fatah, Hikma, and State of Law lists. Iran, influential as it is, won’t allow this combination and can disrupt the process in many ways, not least through the pro-Iranian lists in Parliament. This means, Fatah, at least, will have to be part of any coalition government. However, the conflicting political agendas would be a destabilizing factor in the government.

The biggest hurdle will be to achieve an agreement among all the parties on the “three presidencies,” as they are called in Iraq (speaker, president, and prime minister), before Parliament could even be convened. In the past, the position of speaker was given to the Sunnis, president to the Kurds, and prime minister to the Shia. This combination is not stipulated by the constitution, and it may change this time. The constitution stipulates that the president call Parliament to convene within 15 days of the ratification of the election’s results by the Federal Court. Parliament will have 15 days to elect a speaker (with two deputies), and then elect a president. The president will then receive a nomination for prime minister from the largest alliance in Parliament. The prime minister-designate will have 30 days to form a government. If he or she fails, the president will ask the nominee of the second largest alliance to try. It’s a lengthy and cumbersome process and usually takes place after hard bargaining, and regional and international mediation.

Thus far, Abadi stands out as the most likely to be chosen as prime minister, given that he enjoys one characteristic that others don’t: universal acceptability. He is broadly acceptable to Iraqis, regional powers, and the United States. Further, Iran can work with him if he is the agreed-upon choice. He possesses national, Islamic, and Shia credentials and were Iran to openly oppose him it would risk alienating Iraqis. Most Iraqi leaders can work with him, too, except perhaps his predecessor, Maliki. But the strings that Maliki can pull are no longer strong enough to influence the choice of prime minister. He only has 25 parliamentary seats (two of them are held by his sons-in-law) and is still officially the secretary general of the Islamic Dawa Party, of which Abadi is the chairman of the politburo. Although Maliki is more senior in the party hierarchy than Abadi, he will risk alienating many members of the party, and Iraqis at large, if he is seen to be impeding the appointment of a senior party figure as prime minister. That’s why he won’t stand in Abadi’s way, at least publicly.

Forming a coalition is going to be a long and arduous process and it will require some mediation, perhaps arm-twisting, by the United States and other regional powers to reach a successful conclusion. In 2010, the process lasted nine months, even with U.S. and Iranian mediation, and it may take just as long this time.

Hamid Alkifaey is an Iraqi writer, academic, and expert on democratization.

alkifaey@gmail.com

http://www.agsiw.org/inconclusive-elections-leave-iraqis-searching-for-compromise/